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
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
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THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE IN PHILIPPINE  
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS-- THE GREAT DIFFERENCE

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U. S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

VENANCIO R. DUQUE, JR., Colonel, Philippine Constabulary  
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1968  
M.M.(BM), University of the Philippines, 1979

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Recent developments in the Philippine local police system have proved the police has a significant role in the overall government counterinsurgency operations. While the traditional role of providing effective and efficient police service is the INP's main contribution to the effort, the police manpower resources and the inherent popular support they enjoy suggest greater role in counterinsurgency operations. Given the adequate administrative, operational and logistical support, training, and the proper leadership at all levels of command, the local police as a national organization could be a very effective force in operations against Communist insurgency in the Philippines.

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Colonel Venancio R. Duque, Jr.

Title of thesis: The Integrated National Police in Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations-- The Great Difference

Approved by:

Larry B. Hamby, Thesis Committee Chairman  
(LTC Larry B. Hamby, M.A.)

Christopher R. Gabel, Member, Graduate Faculty  
(Christopher R. Gabel, Ph. D.)

Walter S. Towns, Member, Consulting Faculty  
(LTC Walter S. Towns, Ph. D.)

Accepted this 30th day of May, 1984 by Philip V. Butler  
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

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# ABSTRACT

THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE IN PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS-- THE GREAT DIFFERENCE, by Colonel Venancio R. Duque, Jr., Philippine Constabulary, 99 pages.

This study examines the Integrated National Police as it is presently organized and study its operational employment in Philippine: government efforts against Communist insurgency.

Recent developments in the Philippine local police system have proved the police has a significant role in the overall government counterinsurgency operations. While the traditional role of providing effective and efficient police service is the INP's main contribution to the effort, the police manpower resources and the inherent popular support they enjoy suggest greater role in counterinsurgency operations. Given the adequate administrative, operational and logistical support, training, and the proper leadership at all levels of command, the local police as a national organization could be a very effective force in operations against Communist insurgency in the Philippines.

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The Author



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background and Problem

Like many developing countries today, the Philippines is plagued with Communist insurgency the ultimate goal of which is the establishment of a Communist form of government in the country. This problem of Communist incursion has haunted the Philippines for decades. Since the 1920's the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has been exploiting the grievances of the poor in order to seize political power. In early 1950, the Hukbalahap (Huk) movement, spawned by massive agrarian unrest in the central plains of Luzon, almost plunged the nation into a civil war. These Huks were able to draw mass support from the oppressed tenants of Central Luzon in waging a rebellion that lasted until the late 1950's. They were never able to convince the masses to embrace Communism, but were able to mobilize enough followers to harrass the countryside.(1) These insurgent bands, now under the re-established CPP, continue to threaten government stability.(2)

Communist insurgency has not only engendered problems in the maintenance of law and order, but has

substantially drained government resources which otherwise would have been channeled to countryside development, for anti-guerrilla operations are expensive. For example, in the eight years of insurgency in Malaya, the British spent \$200,000.00 for each killed or captured.(3) In the Philippines President Marcos warned during a speech in Dumaguete City on May 12, 1967 that in defending national security, "the government might be compelled to spend almost the entire budget for military defense. First to suffer would be the roads, schools, bridges, airports, and wharves."(4) In such a case, economic development plans could not be implemented.

To meet this Communist threat, current government strategy requires the general mobilization of all available government agencies. The Regional Development Councils established in the mid-1970's have been upgraded and renamed Regional Security and Development Councils. Membership in this body includes every regional director of all government ministries and important bureaus, as well as chairmen of the governors' league, mayors' league, and the regional association of barangay captains. This body monitors, coordinates, and integrates all civil and military programs in the region. In addition to these initiatives would be the enormous manpower thrown in the field of protection and one can visualize the magnitude of this nagging Philippine problem.

The Philippine government has continuously involved

itself in countering the Communist threat since the Huk rebellion of the 1950s. Government programs have been instituted to reverse social and economic conditions that promote the cause of insurgency. Every known doctrine in counterinsurgency operations, especially of socio-economic-political aspects, has been studied and considered. As an extreme emergency measure, martial law was declared by President Marcos in September 21, 1972 in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Constitution.(15) This was lifted in January 1981.(16) Accompanying all these measures were the security operations (17) which sought the neutralization of the structure of the CPP and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). In keeping with Communist tenet of protracted struggle (18), the problem of Communist insurgency persists and, to some extent, is escalating and expanding.

The increase in insurgent activities since the re-establishment of the CPP in the late 60s has had tremendous effects on the peace and order in the countryside. Murder, armed robbery, extortion, kidnapping and other forms of banditry have been attributed to the NPA. The seeming desperation of the subversive and insurgent elements has resulted in terrorism.(19) The stark realities of insurgent terrorism and other criminal acts resulted in intensified operations against the NPA, thus involving the police in the overall government effort. In addition, the integration of all the local police forces

into the Integrated National Police (INP) in 1975 resulted in an increased role for these police units in counterinsurgency operations.

The military has always dominated operations against insurgents for the very reason that insurgency has traditionally been given a military perspective. Almost anything that threatens national security is readily given military connotation. Consequently, government reaction in the past placed the military in a major role, while the other government agencies merely supported it. This is still so today. With its manpower, firepower, and mobility, the military is undoubtedly most capable of conducting anti-guerrilla operations. While this is true, one should not underestimate police capabilities in counterinsurgency operations. Recent developments in the Philippine government's efforts against insurgency have resulted in increased police involvement.

Another feature of current counterinsurgency measures undertaken by the Philippines involves semantics. Recent policy has changed the term "Communist", which formerly referred to an insurgent regular/hardcore (10), to "Communist terrorist (CT)". His sympathizers and supporters are referred to as CT sympathizers/supporters. What formerly were termed "military operations" are now officially called "police operations". Thus all operations conducted either by military units, police (INP) units, or jointly by military and police units are called police

operations. In effect this policy requires that all operations against insurgents must not only result in the physical destruction or neutralization of the enemy but also his eventual prosecution in the proper courts. Captured CTs are treated as criminals and are subject to further investigation. If government personnel are wounded or killed during encounters with the insurgents, criminal charges are filed. Top insurgent leaders are normally charged with "Rebellion with murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc.." (11) The terms "CT" and "police operations" are used in all official communications, which include press releases.

Police participation in the current counterinsurgency efforts may also be viewed as a consequence of their being initial targets of CT atrocities, especially in remote areas. This is so because the police stations are usually small in personnel strength, poorly armed, and are the most visible representatives of the government in any locality. (12) The police are also symbols of authority in the villages which makes them attractive targets of CT attacks. If captured, the low-powered firearms normally issued to the police can significantly contribute to the arsenal of the CTs.

In August 1977, Police Captain Diosdado de Leon, Station Commander (Chief of Police) of the Mabalacat Police Station in Pampanga (in Central Luzon), received from President Marcos the award for his unit as "The Best Police



Station (Rural Category) of the Philippines for PC/INP Year 1977."(13) A few months later in 1978, P/Captain de Leon was killed in an encounter with Communist insurgents during a government operation in Mabalacat, Pampanga. His misfortune and that of other INP men in similar circumstances dramatically portray the active employment of the police in current government counterinsurgency operations.

This study will examine the Integrated National Police as it is presently organized and study its operational employment in government efforts against Communist insurgency. The following are the questions whose answers can only lead to more effective employment of the police in Philippine counterinsurgency efforts and, perhaps, in other countries with similar problems:

1. What were the circumstances that led to the integration of all the local police forces into one national organization, the INP?
2. What were the effects of police integration on government counterinsurgency operations?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the INP that can positively or negatively affect government counterinsurgency efforts?
4. What doctrines, policies, or guidelines, if any, govern the employment of the INP in counterinsurgency operations?

#### Value of the Study

The period from the re-establishment of the CPP in

1968 up to the present is a new chapter in the history of Communist insurgency in the Philippines. Similarly, the active employment of the police upon integration is another chapter in the evolution of Philippine counteractions to its problems of instability. This study will highlight the many benefits of increasing the role of the police in the fight against insurgency. Ultimately, this study will bear on plans to be made or laid out for future counterinsurgency operations not only in the Philippines but in other countries with similar problems as well.

#### Methodology

This study will trace the evolution of the local police in relation to the prevailing conditions of peace and order and insurgency and the state of local government administration and politics. The main focus, however, will be the Integrated National Police. Recent police operations in Northwestern Luzon or Region 1 (See map, Appendix A) should provide valuable insights to the manner of employment of the police in current counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines. The area of Region 1 was selected because of the author's familiarity with that region.

The main sources for this study are policy pronouncements of authorities in the Philippine government, Rules and Regulations of the INP, other official documents,

and interviews with knowledgeable ranking Constabulary officers. Books and other written works shall provide the framework for analyses and comparisons. This author contributed, although modestly, to the drafting of the proposed Police Integration Decree and the implementing rules and regulations after the decree was passed into law in 1975; was, in 1976, designated as the Station Commander (Chief of Police) of the City of Baguio and concurrently the Assistant Provincial Commander of Benguet Province, both of Region 1; and from 1980 until 1983, was assigned as the Provincial Commander and concurrently the Police Superintendent of Ilocos Norte, also of Region 1. These experiences will provide an element of reality, especially in the operational aspect.

#### **Limitation and Scope of Study**

The present Philippine police system (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3) consists mainly of the Constabulary and the local police. While both have been combined to form the Integrated National Police, they nevertheless retain their identities-- the PC or Constabulary are the military component, while the municipal and city police are the civilian police component. The term "police", when used in this study, will refer to the civilian police which is the focus of this research. "INP" will similarly refer to the local

police. Current insurgency will mean the Communist insurgency from the re-establishment of the CPP in 1968 to the present. This period is not only characterized by increased insurgent activities under the more vicious CPP/NPA but also the increased involvement of the police, especially after Police Integration in 1975. The area of Region 1, which comprises seven provinces and four cities, was selected because of the diverse conditions of development throughout the entire region and the terrain which is predominantly mountainous. These conditions are similar to other regions which are likewise affected by insurgency. In Region 1, insurgency affects five out of the seven provinces. This study will assume that police operations in the region is typical of counterinsurgency operations elsewhere in the Philippines.

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## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This review of literature encompasses books and articles and several research works related to insurgency and the police. These selected materials deal on insurgency in the Philippines from the time of the insurrection during both the Spanish and American periods, the Huk rebellion in the 1950's, to the current CPP/NPA and Muslim Separatist movements. Several other materials were reviewed, including accounts of past insurgencies in other countries such as Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The insurgencies in these countries, to include those in the Philippines, have become by-words in the numerous studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency. The valuable information from this review of literature laid the framework which served as the basis for the comprehensive analysis and assessment of the role of the regular police in the current counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines.

#### On the Philippine Insurrection

In *Indians and Insurrectos: The US Army's*

Experience with Insurgency, John M. Gates, a professor of history, blamed military and civilian authorities for the failure of 20th-century counterinsurgency doctrine to reflect the lessons of the 19th-century experience. In Mexico, the Shenandoah Valley, the Great Plains, and the Philippines, guerrillas behaved in the same manner: "fleeing from strength, attacking weakness, preying upon the small isolated garrisons and poorly defended supply trains, killing the lone sentry or the unwary patrol, living off the land with the aid of their people-- and terrorizing those who refused to cooperate or who have joined with the enemy." (1) US Army counteractions were as follows: to protect supply lines, commanders increased the size of the guards assigned and strengthened garrisons along supply routes; commanders protected towns and built forts; and to hunt down the enemy, the Army sent highly mobile, self-contained units to pursue them relentlessly. Whenever possible, the Army enlisted the support of indigenous inhabitants. Gates observed, however, that in these guerrilla campaigns, stories of atrocities were common. These atrocities were mostly acts of pure revenge which have apparently been sanctioned despite efforts made for American soldiers to fight guerrillas within the context of a set of legal and moral restraints.

Jungle Patrol, by Vic Hurley, is the story of the Philippine Constabulary. He described the Philippines in the early 1900's as a jungle consisting of malcontented

insurrectos, religious fanatics, and unadulterated bandits. The traveler kept his weapons always ready. The Philippines was a land where men lived or died according to the proficiency of their arms. As a result of these conditions, the Philippine Constabulary was established over the opposition of the US Army, which asserted that the Constabulary would merely be a focal point for organized resistance against the government. The establishment of the Constabulary demonstrated a principle that was old and well understood by the British administrators of Colonial India-- that native troops, thoroughly understanding the terrain and the psychology of the population, were more effective than white soldiers in the conduct of jungle warfare.(2) The Constabulary was not intended to be a military body but a police unit to put down armed disturbances. The book narrated the heroism of the men of the Constabulary from its formation in 1901 up to its deactivation on January 14, 1936.

"The United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902," by Gerald H. Early, Major, USA, was a thesis presented to the US Army CGSC in 1975. Major Early traced the development of the insurrection which was a hold-over from the Filipino opposition against the Spanish colonial government. The insurrection that the Americans faced was the same anti-Spanish movement, both in the cause and the type of warfare employed. American success was due to the Army's realization that military



victory alone was futile unless the people were won over to the United States and the rebels thereby deprived of the basis of their support. A great advantage to the Americans in the Philippines was that the form of administration they sought to introduce was developed by knowledgeable and prescient men on the scene. These officials were not interested in personal profit or exploiting the people, but tried to insure their well-being within the policy decision of the United States government to retain the Philippines for an indefinite period. Once the genuineness of this concern became apparent to the Filipinos, the way was open for the final pacification of the archipelago.

#### On the Huk Movement in the Philippines

A thesis entitled "I Promise: Magsaysay's Unique Psyop 'Defeats' Huks", written by LTC Clarence G. Barrens, USA and presented to the US Army CGSC, was an extensive study of the Huk movement and the Philippine countermeasures. In particular, his thesis focused on the unique approach of President Ramon Magsaysay in dealing with the Huks. The author outlined Magsaysay's program starting with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP): elimination of ineffective military leaders and units, updating conventional organization to an internal defense posture, better pay and benefits, and effective guidance and direction. These military reforms were complemented by

psychological operations which were integrated with military operations against the insurgents. On the civil side of government, Magsaysay instituted government programs such as land reform and resettlement. The thesis pointed out the personal touch of President Magsaysay which projected the sincerity of the government in resolving the Huk problem. LTC Barrens concluded that other presidents at the time would not have been as effective.

The Forest , published in 1963, was a personal record of the Huk guerrilla struggle in the Philippines. The author, William J. Pomeroy, was an American who came in contact with the Huk movement while serving as a US Army historian with the Fifth Air Force during World War II in the Philippines. After the war he returned to the Philippines as a free-lance writer and studied at the University of the Philippines. He married Celia Mariano, a Filipina, in 1948 and in 1950 they both joined the Huk movement as political teachers and writers. Both were captured during a government military operation in 1952 and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for rebellion. After ten years in prison they were released through executive pardon. William Pomeroy was immediately deported to the United States without his wife who was not granted a passport by the Philippine government.

The Forest is an account of their experiences during the two years they spent with the Huks in the field. Within the movement, the value of popular support was

emphasized. This demanded from every member of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) a high degree of discipline and self-sacrifice. Pomeroy only considered the Army, Constabulary, Air Force, and Navy as constituting the potent enemy of the Huk movement. Town police forces were placed in the same category as hacienda guards and the armed private guards of politicians. He highlighted the legal prosecution of captured Huks. They were charged with "rebellion complexed with murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping." (3) Huks killing soldiers during encounters were charged with murder; when they looted military outposts, robbery; and when they captured or held captive a soldier, kidnapping.

Uldarico S. Baclagon, Colonel, now retired, wrote Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Analysis of documents captured from local Communists, and examination of pronouncements of captured party members brought out the following facts:

1. That the Communist Party of the Philippines is associated with International Communism;
2. That the CPP aims to seize national power thru military and other means;
3. That the CPP organized the Hukbalahap (Huks) and its successor, the HMB;
4. That infiltration and subversion are to be continued by the Communists in their persistent bid to gain more supporters and sympathizers among the Filipino people;
5. That Communism cannot thrive in an atmosphere of general contentment and prosperity, where the

government is responsive to the interest and welfare of the masses; and

6. That the capabilities of the dissident force is affected by the unity, cooperation, and attitude of the people toward the insurgent cause.(4)

Many operations of the AFP turned out to be successful because of good and timely intelligence. Strategic intelligence was introduced and tactical intelligence was given proper direction. Impetus was given to intelligence training by the establishment of a Criminal Investigation School. Paid agents began to engage in undercover work. The Constabulary and Army intelligence were merged with the establishment of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS). In due time the MIS started producing results which culminated in the celebrated arrest of the members of the POLITBURO of the CPP in Manila. In the field, tactical intelligence yielded better and more reliable combat intelligence.

Colonel Bacalagon stressed the value of popular support. When the campaign against the Huks began, the Philippine Constabulary found the people in the countryside uncooperative because of the general discontent and the apparent loss of faith in the government. Compounding this problem were the abuses committed by the PC troops. The government then recognized the causes of the breakdown in civilian morale and immediately instituted reforms in the military establishment and started a clean-up of the government. In due time, the people began to look again at the government forces as their protectors.

Civilian support for the government went as far as working as a combat unit together with an AFP unit. These civilians were civilian security guards, regular police, home guards, and special police (presumably provincial guards under the employ of the provincial governors). As combat forces, these civilian elements were employed in several ways as follows:

1. As security for towns and barrios to protect the lives and properties of the civilians;
2. As a blocking force to intercept movements of enemy troops and supplies;
3. As guides and paid laborers to help haul supplies of both troops and civilians; and
4. As a striking force, with an objective of its own, in coordination with AFP units.(5)

Counter-Guerrilla Operations (The Philippine Experience) by Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano and Lieutenant Colonel T. R. Bohannon, which was published in 1962, described the guerrilla and the nature of the movement to which he belongs. The existence of a viable guerrilla movement indicates a serious weakness in the political base of the government. An early identification of these weaknesses and giving them the proper attention may mean an early solution to a guerrilla problem. This was typified by the Philippine Huk rebellion. The Huk slogans "Land for the Landless" and "Equal justice for All," which found widespread support, prompted the government to revise its counteraction policy from a

purely military effort to an integrated government program. This new approach dramatically reversed the popular support that the Huks initially enjoyed. Corollary to this program was a determined effort to reorganize the Armed Forces into a more effective and better disciplined force.

Among the problems encountered by the military were poor communication facilities and the absence of control over the municipal forces by the AFP. The same is true with respect to the other civilian guards.(6) These guards were under the control of the provincial governors while the police were under the municipal mayors. In Bulacan (just outside of Manila), a military commander was able to persuade the local executives to give the military a degree of control over these civilian forces. These forces were included in the tactical plans of subsequent operations conducted by the AFP unit concerned. Whenever a civilian guard force became capable of putting up substantial resistance to insurgent attacks against the towns and villages or holding off such attacks until military reinforcements arrive, military troops were withdrawn from the area for redeployment elsewhere.(7) Civilian forces performed both intelligence and combat operations. Two reasons dictate maximum utilization of civilian forces for defense of civilian communities:

1. They represent economy of force; and
2. An effective civilian guard unit represents the commitment by sectors of the population to the side of government.(8)

Valeriano and Bohannon had this to say about civil forces:

Civil guards form part of the spiral of success (or failure) in counter-guerrilla operations. More civilian support plus better enemy information plus better civil guards plus effective troops equal still more civilian cooperation plus still better information, and even more effective civil defense equals more and more effective patrolling, etc., until the final phase in the spiral-- no more guerrillas.(9)

In 1973, Commander Jesse W. Lewis, Jr. wrote "A Successful Approach Toward Countering Insurgency-- Philippines, 1946-1955," which was a study of the anti-Huk campaign written so as to gain a deeper understanding and knowledge of those elements which contribute in a positive manner toward success in a counterinsurgency operations. His research showed that insurgency has taken on an international aspect and has become an element of worldwide struggle. The proponents of international Communism, sensing the opportunity, have especially trained operators to direct, lead, and exploit insurgent passions toward their own oppressive ends. While seemingly supporting the objectives of a just rebellion to gain reform and/or to exercise governmental power, a new objective has been added: to further Communist ideology. The rebellious insurgent is in danger of being a tool of Communist revolution-- unwittingly, he becomes an agent of foreign subversion and aggression. Insurgent movements have become one of the major weapons in the struggle of power between the Communist block and the Free World.(10) Lewis suggested

that the Philippine Huk rebellion has become part of the struggle.

The Huk movement started as a peasant resistance movement against autocratic and feudalistic landowners. This was compounded by social imbalances, corruption in government and the general government neglect of the people's welfare. Educated people, who originally were disinclined to Communist ideology, backed the Huks simply because there was no other effective, organized force that championed social change. Political channels were deaf to pressure for social reforms which prompted recourse to violent struggle. These factors added impetus to the movement which had its peak after the 1949 elections.(11)

Before 1950, the Communist problem was never appreciated and was largely treated as a routine police matter. The conspiracy grew bigger, its growth and initial success spawned and fed by general discontent. Military abuses further contributed to the chaos until government officials finally came to realize that the solution to the Huk rebellion was well beyond a normal police approach. Ramon Magsaysay was one such official who understood the necessity for a more integrated and centralized national effort. Subsequent government policy was "All-out Friendship or All-out Force."(12)



### On the CPP/NPA and the Muslim Separatists

People's War in the Philippines , published by the Union of Democratic Filipinos in August 1974, is a primer on the re-established CPP and its armed fighting force, the New People's Army. This primer outlines the program of the CPP/NPA. The principal objective of the revolution is to liberate the Filipino people from foreign exploitation and domestic feudal oppression; drive out the imperialists; carry out agrarian revolution in the countryside; and form a coalition government that would be representative of all the patriotic classes in Philippine society. The revolutionary party, the CPP, shall be the leading class force in the people's democratic revolution.(13)

The NPA was established on March 29, 1969, with the primary purpose of waging the people's war. NPA strategy is to first build a mass base among the poor peasants. The peasants are organized and politicized in accordance with the programs of the revolution and its three basic enemies: imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. With the people's support as a foundation, the NPA would attack the "reactionary" armed forces where they are the weakest, capture weapons, confuse them and keep them in fear and on the run. As the people's war reaches higher stages, it would take on the clear character of a civil war as larger and larger areas would be liberated from the imperialist and landlord control. These areas would be protected by the

NPA and the people's militia.(14)

Alliances and cooperation are being developed between the CPP/NPA and other "anti-fascist" armed forces which have sprung up in different parts of the country since the declaration of Martial Law. This includes the Bangsa Moro Army and Muslim Revolutionary Force fighting for self-determination in Mindanao. The CPP/NPA also seeks to unite all forces to overthrow the US-Marcos clique and establish democratic coalition government.(15)

The primer carries the basic rules of the NPA which serve as a guide for its members. These rules were drawn up and issued in a meeting of commanders and fighters of the NPA on March 29, 1969 and approved by the Central Committee of the CPP on May 13, 1969. The NPA emerged after shedding off the counter-revolutionary revisionist errors of the Huks under Taruc and Lava. The NPA's main strategic principle is protracted people's war with its armed units ever growing in the countryside and consistently encircling the cities until such time that the government forces are finally exhausted. The protracted war has three phases: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, and finally, the strategic offensive.(16)

"Insurgency and Subversion in a Developing Country: A Case Study in the Philippines," a thesis written by Tirso H. Gador, LTC, Philippines, and presented to the US Army CGSC in 1982 surveys the conditions in the Philippines to

determine the cultural elements and other factors that gave rise to the Communist insurgency situation. The Philippines' colonial past largely influenced its political, economic, and social structures which have resulted in imbalances in wealth distribution and economic opportunities. Communist subversives have exploited these conditions in their pursuit of power in the Philippines.

Colonel Gador, the 1978-1980 Provincial Commander of the province of Cagayan, described the process by which insurgents infiltrate a village. An expansion group initially conducts a so-called social survey of the target village. Then a very deliberate approach follows. Attractive propaganda lines serve to guide the insurgents in achieving their infiltration into the local community. However, the CTs are ever ready to use terror if the soft approach fails.(17)

The present administration of President Marcos, in initiating political reforms, sought among other things to strengthen the political base of the government by revitalizing the barrio, officially called the barangay. The barangays were given greater involvement in government development programs. A new innovation was the creation of barangay courts which complemented the formal court system. The barangay courts were designed for out-of-court settlement of civil and land cases and the less serious criminal offenses before these cases are elevated to the proper courts.(18)

A thesis presented to the US Army CGSC in 1983, "Employment of Natives in Counter-Insurgency Operations in the Philippines," written by Antonio S. Nale, LTC, Philippines, described the experiences of the Philippine Army in utilizing native forces (local tribes) in fighting guerrillas from 1946-1981. Because of the growing threat from the CPP and Muslim separatists, the government counteractions have involved the use of natives or hill tribes. LTC Nale identified five uses of natives in counterinsurgency:

1. As guides.
2. As supply carriers.
3. As sources of information.
4. As security for base camps and villages.
5. As combatants.(19)

In the field of intelligence, the Philippine natives are reliable sources of information only if no relatives, friends, or close tribal members are compromised. This is so because of strong family ties among tribes. The natives, when organized as village defense forces, have not been very effective because of their propensity to abuse whatever authority given to them. In many instances, such abuses had negative results, thus worsening the insurgent situation. This prompted military authorities to tighten their supervision over these civilian defense forces, employing the Army Special Forces

for the purpose. In combat operations, the natives are integrated into the tactical plans instead of being allowed to operate independently. (20)

"The Employment of the Artillery in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare" by LTC Orlando V. Soriano, Philippine Army, presented to the US Army CGSC in 1981, is a study on the use of artillery in Philippine counterinsurgency operations. It described the guerrilla war being waged against the government by the Muslim rebels and Communist insurgents. The study concluded that artillery is a necessary complement to the maneuver forces in effecting tactical and psychological superiority against the guerrillas. This was qualified, however, by the proviso that damage to civilian lives and properties must be minimal if not entirely avoided. Government forces must not only direct effort toward winning a tactical operations but more importantly, must gain the support and sympathy of the people.

#### On Insurgencies in Other Countries

Counter-Insurgency Operations by Julian Paget, published in 1967, is a historical account of the conflicts in Cyprus, Malaya, and Kenya. Paget analyzed each insurgency from the cause of the uprising to the success of the tactics employed against it. He not only brought together the details of these campaigns but has analyzed

them in such a manner as to draw essential lessons for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in general.

According to Paget, an insurgent force needs to be assured of the following basic requirements in order to conduct a successful campaign: a cause to fight for, support from the local populace, bases, mobility, and supplies. Conversely, if the Security Forces can deprive the insurgents of any of these essentials, it may prove to be a more effective method of defeating the revolt than hunting down individual rebels.(21)

The emergency in Malaya was a classic example of a Communist take-over bid, based on insurgency and guerrilla warfare. The insurgents were 90 percent Chinese posing as a nationalist anti-British movement. The Communist plan of campaign was based on three phases: first, they would organize an insurgent movement by the masses against the British government; second, they would create liberated areas under Communist control; and third, they would establish a liberation army and sweep the British out of the country. The insurgency never succeeded because the Security Forces successfully broke up large groups of guerrillas and isolate them from the people.

The British High Commissioner stressed that the solution to the emergency was not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but rather in winning the hearts and minds of the people.(22) The whole population was mobilized to play a part in fighting the Communists. The civil

government, the police and the military were integrated under one central command and control structure. The military were given more mobility and firepower, while the police were retrained and provided with more and better equipment.

The insurgencies in Kenya and Cyprus, which were subdued by the British, were different only in their respective goals. Basically, they were guerrilla wars using guerrilla techniques and strategies. In both, British counteraction centered on the "winning the hearts and minds" and the "isolate the guerrilla" approach that required total mobilization of the civil government, military and police.

Major Joel J. Snyder wrote "Paramilitary Forces Need a New Mission" which was published in the US Air Force Journal in 1968. The article examined the role of paramilitary forces and regular police in an insurgency considering the the varying intensity of the conflict. While Major Snyder enumerated the many benefits of employing these forces, their inherent weaknesses have resulted in dismal failures in Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaya. The insurgent tactics of attacking weakness has made the usually small and isolated but most visible government force even more vulnerable.(23) The article concluded that there exists a limit to the effectiveness of non-military force in an insurgency.

Lessons from Portugal's Counter-Insurgency

Operations in Africa by Thomas H. Henriksen is an instructive investigation of Portugal's 13-year counterinsurgency operations in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. These guerrilla movements were of continental application because of the colonial stature of the African states where social (sometimes ethnic) injustices, corruption and governmental inefficiencies have produced revolutionary conditions. In fighting these insurgencies, Portuguese strategies and tactics have been largely influenced by insurgency operations in other countries. The Portuguese army applied various schemes to deny the rural population to the guerrillas. Strict security measures were a determinant of quiet cities and towns. Hand in hand with military operations were government programs which were pursued despite insurgent attempts to disrupt their completion. A major aspect of Portuguese military operations was the employment of recruited African soldiers which neutralized the insurgent issue of racial injustice. Civic action, propaganda, and politicization were conducted in support of military operations. One lesson, however, was that troop morale, welfare, and their politicization must never be neglected. This oversight caused general dissatisfaction among the Portuguese junior officers. To a certain degree, those junior officers did not have a full appreciation for the Portuguese efforts in that part of the world.(24)



### Summary

The nature of insurgency has not changed over the years. Existing insurgencies in the world today have striking similarities. Insurgency thrives where there is general discontent among the population and where the government is weak and corrupt. It is the weapon of the weaker side characterized by small offensive operations in selected forms, times, and places.(25) These irregular bands, calling themselves insurgents or guerrillas, compensate for lack of numbers and military skill by superior mobility and fair knowledge of the countryside. By attacking small groups of the enemy under surprise conditions, they achieve local success. Insurgency champions the cause of the discontented, such discontentment being real or apparent. The insurgents stir up the people, thereby causing insurgent wars.(26) It counts on popular support for it to prosper. Lastly, insurgency is characterized by the absence of a definite timetable.

Communism has become an added dimension in modern insurgencies. Communist-inspired insurgencies dominate a great number of guerrilla movements throughout the world. The Communists ride on a legitimate call for socio-political-economic reforms in their desire to install a Communist form of government in the affected country. The people's discontent becomes a convenient pretext to

wage a guerrilla war against the existing government. Such was the case in the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, and other countries.

Successful government counteractions have generally adopted the "battle of the hearts and minds" approach, recognizing the fact that insurgency is fanned by popular support. Government strategy has been characterized by the integration of civil, military and police agencies and forces under one general effort. Civic action and propaganda have gone hand in hand with military and police operations. Governments have likewise exerted sincere efforts to eliminate the real causes of discontent because insurgency is an indication that there are deficiencies in government services or in the government itself.

Accounts of Philippine insurgencies have noted the successful adaptation of the above strategy both by the Americans and the Philippine government in fighting the insurrectos and the Huks, respectively. In vivid details, the several materials reviewed described the employment of the military as an integral part of the effort against the insurgents. Very little has been mentioned about the role of the police. If the police ever participated in counterinsurgency operations, they were employed more by accident rather than by design. It was more of an initiative on the part of the military commanders to use local police forces. In fact, the police were considered in the same category as natives, the civilian (private)

security forces under the employ of landowners and politicians, and civilian volunteers. Local police forces have been in existence since the Spanish era but they were not formally mobilized in the same manner as was the case of the police in Malaya during the state of emergency. Nonetheless, the local police were known to have participated in several operations against the insurgents, either directly or in support of these operations.

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## CHAPTER 3

### OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE POLICE SYSTEM

The enforcement of laws, maintenance of peace and order and public safety, and the prevention and suppression of crime are the fundamental responsibilities of the President, who is the Chief Executive. The AFP, the PC, the INP (local police), the NBI, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and lately, the barangay tanods are the primary agencies of the government tasked to perform these police functions. However, peace and order and public safety are basically confined to the PC and the local police forces. This chapter will discuss each of these agencies, their missions, their general organizations, and their relationships with one another. This overview will trace the evolution of the Philippine police system.

#### The Armed Forces of the Philippines

The AFP was established pursuant to National Defense Act of 1935. It embraces the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Constabulary as a unified command under the Ministry of National Defense (See Appendix B) The President is the Commander-in-Chief and can call upon the entire AFP

to quell large-scale rebellion or emergencies.

The AFP is basically a citizens army composed of a nucleus of regulars and a large reserve force. The manpower requirements of the regular force are met by voluntary enlistment. Augmenting the standing regular force are the twenty-year-olds undergoing compulsory training. Career officers of the regular force of the four military services are drawn from the graduates of the country's military academy. The rest are integrees who are commissioned with the regular force. Reserve officers are graduates of the four-year ROTC programs at selected universities.

#### The Philippine Constabulary

The national police concept was not an original creation when the Philippine Commission established the Philippine Constabulary in 1901. During the Spanish period, the Guardia Civil was created to partially relieve the colonial army troops of their work in policing the towns. The Guardia Civil was very military in organization but administered and controlled by the civil government.(1) It was a notional police body whose membership was purely Spanish and European. The Guardia Civil was then feared and hated by the Filipinos because of their harsh measures against the citizens.(2) It became the instrument of the Spaniards in detecting their enemies among the Filipinos.

On August 8, 1901, the Philippine Commission passed Act 175 creating the Philippine Constabulary:

An Insular Constabulary is hereby established under the general supervision of the Civil Governor for the purpose of better maintaining peace, law and order in the various provinces of the Philippines, organized, officered and governed as herein set forth, which shall be known as the Philippine Constabulary.(3)

Military titles were not adopted for the new force. A force not exceeding 150 men for each province was created and placed under the Chief of Constabulary and four Assistant Chiefs. The pay rates which were established were much lower than those in effect in the US Army. Captain Henry T. Allen of the 6th United States Cavalry was picked as the first Chief of Constabulary by then Governor-General William Howard Taft.(4)

The Constabulary had been recommended by US Army officers familiar with the operations in the Philippines who were of the opinion that the time was ripe for the organization of Filipinos in military and police capacities. While an increase in US Army strength was an option being considered, the Philippine Commission commented in recommending the Philippine Constabulary--

Whilst the American soldier is unsurpassed in war, as it is understood among civilized people, he does not make the best policeman, especially among a people whose language and customs are new and strange to him, and in our opinion should not be put to that use when, as we believe, a better substitute is at hand.(5)

When the Commonwealth was established in 1935, the Philippine Constabulary was transferred to the New Army of



the Philippines on January 14, 1935, to form the nucleus of the Philippine Army.(6) The PC air unit became the nucleus of the Philippine Air Force. When independence was finally granted in 1946, the PC was known as the Military Police Command until 1949.(7) It was again merged with the AFP, again as Philippine Constabulary, in 1949 by then President Quirino. It has since then remained as a major service of the Armed Forces.

As a major service of the AFP, the PC, as a national police force, "shall maintain general peace and order in the country." Its national defense role is to "perform home defense duties in rear areas and as the Chief of Staff, AFP may direct." In order to perform these missions, the PC has 13 regional commands, adopting the political subdivision of the country. It has 72 provincial commands. With its nation-wide organization, it is the nucleus of the INP. (See Appendix C)

#### The National Bureau of Investigation

The National Bureau of Investigation, otherwise known as the NBI, was created by law on June 19, 1947 by Republic Act No. 157. This agency was patterned after the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States. NBI started as the Division of Investigation during the Commonwealth period, but its operation was suspended during the Japanese occupation. It was reactivated as the NBI

after the war.

The NBI basically performs three functions, namely, investigative, service and research. It provides investigative assistance to other police agencies including the PC. It also provides criminal laboratory services and is charged with the country's personal identification files. It is the investigative arm of the Ministry of Justice. Upon the creation of the INP, the NBI was given the task of investigating all cases involving the government as a party such as fraud and corruption.:

#### The National Police Commission

The National Police Commission was organized on September 12, 1966 by virtue of Republic Act 4864. The Act, also known as the Police Act of 1966, created the POLCOM, as it was then called, an advisory body to the President on all matters affecting local police administration. It was also assigned the function of: giving police eligibility examinations, inspecting and prescribing standard police organizations and equipment, training, and confirming appointments and promotions of policemen as appointed by the municipal and city mayors. It was later redesignated the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) with an expanded membership to provide a more effective performance of its role in police professionalization. With police integration, the NAPOLCOM

was transferred to the Ministry of National Defense and its functions of training and communications were transferred to the INP.

### The Philippine Coast Guard

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is a national police agency whose main function is the enforcement of the country's Maritime Laws. The PCG was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 5173 on August 5, 1967. It is a major operating unit of the Philippine Navy. Its responsibilities also include such maritime affairs as testing and licensing seamen and vessels, providing aids to navigation, and protecting lives and properties at sea.

### The Local Police

Before the Spanish colonization, the Philippines was divided into political units called barangays. (8) Each barangay was headed or ruled by a datu who was responsible for peace and order within his jurisdiction, in addition to the exercise of his basic powers of executive, legislative, and judicial. The datu designated a chief warrior, who, together with some subordinates, were to enforce the decrees, customs and traditions. The chief warrior was in effect the chief of police.(9)

When the Spaniards came, they retained the

barangays but renamed their heads cabeza de barangay. The basic unit of government were the towns or pueblos under the gobernadorcillo. Several barangays comprised one town.(10) A significant development was the formal creation of police units in the towns. The towns used young men for police called cuadrilleros who were drafted for service in weekly turns. They served under the orders of local civil officials.(11) The City of Manila had two police forces, the veterana organized in 1872 of 400 men who served under the orders of the mayor, and the municipal guards, fewer in number, for the service of the city council and the court.(12)

In 1900 the Philippine Commission, following the general practice in the United States, created the municipal police, placed initially under the military authorities, and later under the municipal presidents upon the organization of the municipal governments. In creating the provincial governments, the Philippine Commission made the municipal police subject to the provincial governor for service anywhere in the province as public interest might require.(13) The municipal presidents appointed persons who were to be the municipal police except the chiefs of police who were appointed by the provincial governors.(14) The Commission also created the Manila Police and the Baguio Police.(15) These municipal and city police forces were placed under the supervision of the Chief of Constabulary who prescribed the arms and uniforms used by these police

forces.(16)

As it had been during the Spanish period, the municipal police were largely regarded by the municipal presidents as their personal servants and consequently used as messengers and for menial duties, such as serving food during meals. Because of this, the municipal police never became an efficient force in the maintenance of public order.(17) This police system which was established by the Americans was the same local police system adopted when the Philippines was granted independence.

On August 8, 1975, these municipal and city police forces were integrated under the umbrella of the Integrated National Police.

### The Barangay Tanod

In the barrios or barangays, there are volunteers who assist the barangay captain in maintaining order. These volunteers used to be called barangay or barrio police but a recent Ministry of Local Government ruling has changed this to barangay tanod, which means guard in Pilipino, the national language. The tanod is not legally a policeman. His authority to make arrests is within the purview of "citizens arrest," that is, when the person is about to commit a crime, has actually committed a crime, or is an escaped prisoner. The tanod is not authorized to bear arms but can wear uniforms as may be prescribed by the

barangay captain which should not resemble the uniform of the military or the INP. The barangay tanod assists the local police (INP) by reporting the occurrence of any crime, accident, public disturbances, and presence of escaped prisoners or criminal elements in the barangay. This group patrols the locality to prevent, deter or minimize the commission of crimes. Adjuncts to the barangay tanod are the barangay traffic brigades for barangays in the urban centers. As their name implies, they assist in traffic control and direction in coordination with the INP traffic units in their respective areas. In affluent municipalities and cities, the traffic brigades are given remuneration. Like the tanod, they are not armed but may wear identifying uniforms and paraphernalia.

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## CHAPTER 4

### THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE

#### Problems of the Old Police System

Prior to police integration, the local police system was characterized by the existence of localized and independently organized police forces. There were as many police forces as there were cities and municipalities. The organization of these police forces, the appointment of police personnel, equipment, operational deployment, and training were exclusively the concern of local governments. This fragmented organizational setup resulted in several critical problems which were inimical to peace and order throughout the country.

There was general disharmon among the local police forces and the other law enforcement agencies, which hampered peace and order campaigns. Disparity in salary scales caused jealousies among these units. Compounding this problem was the question of jurisdiction which precluded police operations beyond their respective territorial boundaries. The problem of jurisdiction was not only confined to territory but also to jurisdiction in



the handling of cases. Some laws gave the NBI, the PC, and the local police concurrent jurisdiction over the same criminal cases. This duplication in function aggravated the problem.

Professionalism in the discharge of police function was largely limited to police forces of affluent cities and municipalities. Police facilities and equipment, training, and operations depended on the budget afforded by each local government. Police standards differed from one police force to another. Consequently, inefficiency and problems of discipline resulted, affecting not only police service but also the police image in the eyes of the public.

Worst among the problems faced by the police was political interference. The disposition of criminal cases was dictated by the local politicians in most parts of the country. Henchmen and relatives of influential politicians and even politicians themselves became "untouchables." Appointment of policemen was largely influenced by the political affiliations of the prospective police applicants and seldom by their qualifications. The abuse of this appointing powers by the mayors resulted in the local police being vulnerable to political interference. The police, having been appointed by the mayor, became subservient to the mayor as a matter of gratitude. Some unscrupulous politicians made use of the police forces for their political ends. Some police forces even ended up as

the personal private armies of such politicians.

#### Police Act of 1966

The sad state of the local police service became more apparent with the growing sophistication of the criminals. This condition evoked national attention and concern. The initial government effort at reform resulted in the enactment of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966. This created the Police Commission under the Office of the President which acted as a supervising agency to oversee the training and professional development of the local police forces. The POLCOM initiated a training program and established training centers in the different regions of the country. The body also developed standard police organizational structures, manning and equipment for the different towns and cities. RA 4864 also provided for a system of police eligibility examinations for the various ranks of the police. The Philippine government sought assistance from the US through the Office for Public Safety of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to obtain police equipment for selected cities and municipalities. Also, as part of the assistance from the USAID, selected police officers were sent abroad for training under the USAID and Colombo Plan programs. The

USAID also sent technical men to the Philippines to assist local police forces develop social defense programs.

#### Rationale and Bases for Police Integration

The police reforms instituted under RA 4864 hardly improved the status of public safety services which include the police, fire, and jail services. For this reason the Constitutional Convention of 1971 included in the new Constitution a provision aimed at upgrading police service, calling for the establishment of an integrated national police. As envisioned the objectives of police integration were:

1. To provide for a system of effective law enforcement and public safety unhampered by political considerations and territorial boundaries;
2. To remove unit rivalries, conflict and indifference among police forces;
3. To provide for a cohesively organized, better coordinated and effectively directed police forces;
4. To provide for a uniform and standardized system of administration, compensation and equipage of police forces, jails and fire departments; and
5. To maximize the utilization of manpower and other resources. (1)

Section 12 of Article XV of the 1973 Constitution stipulates that "The state shall establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organiza and

operation shall be provided by law." This constitutional mandate has been implemented by various Presidential Decrees and Letters of Instructions. All these culminated in the promulgation of Presidential Decree 765 on August 8, 1975, establishing and constituting the Integrated National Police with the Philippine Constabulary as a nucleus and the local police forces and city and municipal fire departments as its components.

#### INP Organizational Structure

Pursuant to PD 765, local police, fire and jail services personnel were integrated into the existing Philippine Constabulary organization for economy and responsiveness to INP missions (Appendix C depicts police integration as per PD 765).

At the national level, the INP is headed by a Director-General who is the concurrent Chief of Constabulary. The present PC Headquarters serves as the headquarters of the INP where appropriate police, fire and jail services units and staffs were introduced into the existing array of general and special staffs and separate units.

For control and administration of the police forces, the country is divided into 13 regions, including the Metro-Manila area. The various headquarters of the PC Regional Commands are correspondingly the INP regional

headquarters with the assignment of qualified police, fire and jail services personnel to key positions in the command and staff organization. PC Regional Commanders are also the INP Regional Directors.

In the Metro-Manila area or National Capital Region (NCR), which is composed of four cities and 13 municipalities, there is the PC Metropolitan Command (PCM) which is the nucleus of the Metropolitan Police Force (MPF). The Commanding General of the PCM is concurrently the Director of the MPF. Because of the peculiarity of the area, NCR is subdivided into four Police and Fire Districts (Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Police/Fire Districts). There are corresponding PCM Sector Commands which complements the four police districts. However, police districts are completely separate from the PCM Sectors.

The PC/INP Regional Commands are further composed of 72 Provincial Commands corresponding to the number of provinces of the country. Each Provincial Command falls under the Regional Command in which it is located. The PC Provincial Command Headquarters is also the INP Provincial Command Headquarters. The Provincial Commander is concurrently the Police Superintendent. The provinces, in turn, are organized into 147 police districts corresponding to the political district subdivisions of the provinces. The PC Company Headquarters serves as the INP District Headquarters with the PC Company Commander concurrently

serving as the INP District Commander.

In certain specific instances, special or separate INP District Commands are created within a province. In such a case, a police commander is designated by the Director-General as recommended by the Regional Commander. The following factors are considered in the creation of separate INP Districts:

1. High population density.
2. High density of buildings.
3. Special commercial and industrial structures.
4. Proximity of the centers of population of adjacent towns or cities so as to form a unified urban area.
5. The effectiveness of command and control exercised by existing provincial headquarters. (2)

Some of the district commands which have so far been established are the Angeles Metropolitan District Command (the area surrounding Clark Air Base), Olongapo Metrodiscom (the areas adjacent to Subic Naval Base), Bacolod Metrodiscom, Cebu Metrodiscom, Davao Metrodiscom, Zamboanga Metrodiscom and Cagayan de Oro Metrodiscom. These metrodiscoms are co-equal to the provincial commands. This metrodiscom organization has been considered to improve law enforcement efforts in highly-urbanized areas.

The regular police districts in the provinces are composed of the different municipal and city police stations. Fire services, in this situation, become part of the police stations where they are found. The police

forces of small municipalities are placed under police units of bigger towns for more effective supervision and control. Complementing these police stations are the PC platoon detachments of the PC Companies.

#### Peace and Order Councils

By virtue of Presidential Letter of Instruction, the Police Advisory Councils at all levels of the INP Command were created. These were adopted to provide for the participation of local executives and other involved sectors in the affairs of the police. Because of the integration which made the police a national agency, the local executives lost their power and authority over their municipal and city police forces. Some of the local police, now national government employees, somehow became arrogant in dealing with their mayors. On the part of the mayors, they became overly critical of police actions. This development somewhat strained the relations between the police and the local administrators. To remedy the situation, the President issued the Letter of Instruction which created the Police Advisory Councils at all command levels down to the municipalities. Recently, these councils were further expanded in composition and renamed Peace and Order Councils (POC) by Executive Order 727 dated September 10, 1981. Their functions are as follows:

1. To advise the police commanders on matters pertaining to peace and order and public safety.
2. To recommend necessary measures to improve the law enforcement system and public safety conditions.
3. To assist the INP in community relations, public information, and in enhancing or promoting citizen's involvement in peace and order and public safety.
4. To recommend disciplinary actions against erring police or fire service personnel.(3)

### Benefits of Police Integration

Police integration brought together under one single national command the almost 1,500 different police forces which then existed throughout the Philippines. Similarly, the 1,500 standards of police service, the same number of organizational structures, the many different standards of police weaponry, and even the variety of uniforms were all placed under one uniform set of standards. One set of pay scales was formulated with just consideration for the variances in cost of living. Integration eliminated the disparities that led to disharmony and jealousy. Jurisdiction for each member of the INP became country-wide and no longer just in the confines of the city or town to which he belongs. Fleeing criminals can no longer take refuge in another town to evade arrest.

Police integration has removed from the local governments the heavy burden of maintaining police service



at an acceptable level of efficiency. Police service is no longer dependent on the financial capability of the locality but on the actual local requirements and the resources available to the national government. Disparities in personnel strength and equipment have been resolved initially by judicious reallocation of police resources. Expensive police laboratory equipment, for instance, may be purchased by the INP and made available to the units as needs arise. The capability of every INP unit is, in theory, proportionately and relatively the same as that of any other unit.

The problem of local political interference has been eliminated. Integration has upgraded the police from local to national government employees. Official police relationships with the local executives is now a matter of coordination and cooperation within the limits of professional police service. Integration has now removed the power to appoint the local police from the local executives and has transferred this power to the Chief of Constabulary who is concurrently the Director-General of the INP.

Integration has paved the way towards police professionalization. It has removed the barriers that characterized the old fragmented organization. Police equipment is in the process of being up-graded and standardized at the expense of the national government. Police training program is conducted at the regional

training centers and the newly-established INP Academy. The high standard of discipline and service that the Constabulary observes is now applied to the entire INP. Any police improvement program can now be implemented without much difficulty.

#### Current Problems of the INP

Police integration has not totally solved the problems and ills of the old police system. The umbrella of the INP with the PC as the nucleus did not change the police forces serving the towns and cities. These INP stations, as they are now called, are basically the same police departments which existed before integration. The policemen which made up these police departments are the present policemen of the INP. None of them have been dismissed or separated upon integration. So the unqualified, the dishonest, and the ineffective continue to serve as members of the INP.

The police are saddled with extraneous duties which are not their primary tasks. One of these is the prosecution of criminal cases filed with the municipal courts all over the country.(4) This task rightfully belongs to the prosecution branch of the Philippine criminal justice system. The INP Station Commanders who are tasked to prosecute these cases are mostly non-lawyers and are, therefore, not professionally qualified to perform

the job. They are likewise at a disadvantage when they face defense lawyers during court trials. Another such non-police duties is the serving of subpoenas, judicial writs, and other court processes. A number of INP personnel are then assigned these jobs, hence, the more important task of serving warrants of arrest is sometimes sacrificed. Similarly, city and municipal ordinances have burdened the INP with such responsibilities as market inspection, clearing sidewalks of vendors, enforcement of price control ceilings, and others. While these non-police activities have been with the Philippine police system for many years, these tasks can be performed even more efficiently by special bodies.(5)

A very serious problem that confronts the whole INP is the matter of PC-INP relationship. The Constabulary man has a history of superiority over the local police. This is true not only among the officers but also the enlisted personnel. When the PC was established in 1901, it was tasked by the Philippine Commission to inspect the municipal police forces.(6) This power over the local police developed the "superiority complex" of the Constabulary men. This was further reinforced when the PC became a major service of the AFP. With police integration, the local police joined the PC organization as "second class citizens," they being the civilian components of the INP. Throughout the INP ladder, the PC elements always exercise command, control and supervision over the

police (See Appendix C).(7) At the moment this problem is not so apparent simply because of the many good things integration has brought to the professional and economic well-being of the police.

These current problems affecting the INP, as presented and discussed in this chapter, do not, however, constitute a formidable stumbling-block to the employment of the police in counterinsurgency operations. The integration of the police into the command and control structure of the PC has provided for the employment of the police by their Constabulary commanders in the operations against the Communist terrorists.

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## CHAPTER 5

### POLICE EMPLOYMENT IN CURRENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The role of the police in current counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines cannot be fully appreciated without examining several of the recent operations against insurgents in Region 1. These encounters between the government forces and CPP/NPA bands have been picked precisely because of the involvement and participation of the local police. In all these incidents, the strengths and weaknesses of the police are markedly manifested. The nature and manner of their employment in combat operations are similarly reflected. And lastly, the command and control structure at the tactical level is presented in its proper perspective.

#### The General Police Role

Traditional police roles, such as maintaining law and order and traffic enforcement, remain the primary function of the local police in the cities and municipalities. These functions are redefined in the central mission of the INP:

The Integrated National Police shall be

responsible for public safety, protection of lives and property, enforcement of laws and maintenance of peace and order within the territorial limits of the Philippines. It shall have the power to prevent crimes, effect arrest of criminal offenders and provide for their detention and rehabilitation, take necessary measures to prevent and control fires, investigate the commission of all crimes and offenses and bring the offenders to justice, and take all necessary steps to insure public safety.(1)

In addition, the police continue to be the primary implementing arm of the local governments insofar as the enforcement of ordinances are concerned. They assist the municipal and city officials and other government agencies in the performance of their respective functions. The police normally help in market inspections, provide security to municipal treasurers who go to collect taxes in distant villages, accompany the circuit judges (2) when they hear cases outside of the town centers, and assist in the dissemination of information. These are just some of the more common non-police functions of the INP. Police communications and transport facilities are often made available for use by the municipalities for these non-police activities.

In the municipalities, the INP has become a major instrument in projecting the government in the villages. Further promoting this image is the program of the INP of conducting information drives throughout the country down to the village level. In these dialogues, the government programs and projects are discussed and clarified. Law

enforcement activities and matters affecting military-police-civilian relationship, including grievances against the government and complaints against military and police personnel are also taken up. These assemblies have been effective in improving the image of the government, particularly that of the military and the police.(3)

#### Insurgent Situation in Region 1 (4)

Region 1, or the Ilocos Region, covers the area on the northwestern coast of Luzon and the area on the western slopes of the Cordillera Mountains (See map, Appendix A). Comprising Region 1 are the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and Pangasinan and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos. The whole area is generally mountainous except for the vast plains in Pangasinan and limited flat stretches along the coast.

Insurgents in the region fall under the area of responsibility (AOR) of both the Northern Luzon Commission (NLC) and Central Luzon Commission (CLC) of the CPP/NPA. The NLC has under its operational jurisdiction the Northwest Luzon and Northeast Luzon Regional Party Committees (NWLRPC and NELRPC, respectively). On the other hand, Pangasinan province is presently under the AOR of the CLC which covers the whole Region 3, as revealed by a captured NWLRPC staff member.



The NWLRPC was formerly the Ilocos-Montana-Pangasinan Regional Party Committee (IMPRPC) of the defunct North Luzon Regional Party Committee (NLRPC) and had its jurisdiction the provinces of Regions 1 and 2. In the mid-1970's the jurisdiction of the NLRPC was divided into two and Region 1 was placed under the NWLRPC which included the Kalinga sub-province and Ifugao, both of Region 2. Later the eastern and western towns of Pangasinan were absorbed by the CLC.

The CPP/NPA penetration of Region 1 started in the first quarter of 1972 when two NPA groups entered the eastern towns of Benguet, the western towns of Mountain Province, and the southeastern towns of Abra. The CPP/NPA expansion was followed by the organization of CT groups in Pangasinan in 1977, Ilocos Sur in 1980, Ilocos Norte in 1981, and La Union in 1982.

The CPP/NPA of Region 1 organized the so-called Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF) with the goal of uniting the middle class in order to generate the widest support for the revolutionary armed struggle. It aims to attract different sectors of society to the revolutionary cause and form legal mass movements. In the countryside, the Party has formed national democratic cells aimed at expanding its mass base and support. Common targets for this activity are the students in urban centers and the labor force in the mining sites and factories of the Baguio Export Processing Zone and the sea port in San Fernando, La

Union.

Current NPA activities are mostly concentrated in organizing guerrilla cadres in CPP/NPA-influenced villages and conducting limited attacks and ambushes on small, isolated government units. These terroristic activities are all geared towards weakening the government forces. The local Communists also desire to create terror and fear among the local population in order to facilitate the development of a revolutionary atmosphere.

#### Operation One-Eyed Jack (5)

In June and July 1981, the Ilocos Norte PC/INP Command launched an intelligence operation code-named Project One-Eyed Jack. In this operation, the local police played a very significant role. While the project was a joint undertaking among the various military and civilian units operating in Ilocos Norte, the composite police team from the Laoag City INP Station dominated the operation. Being familiar with the areas in Ilocos Norte which were long suspected to be targets of NPA expansion, and at the same time intimate with the people living in these areas, the police team easily traced the movements of the target NPA commander named "Bulag", which, in the Pilipino language, means "blind". The timely intelligence build-up resulted in the early arrest of the NPA commander and six of his followers. Confiscated were a brand new Isuzu

40-passenger bus, a new motorcycle, and two .45 caliber pistols. Appropriate charges were subsequently filed with the local civil courts against the NPA prisoners.

The project was initiated after the Ilocos Norte PC/INP received the information that an NPA commander operating in Cagayan (See map, Appendix A) had proceeded to Ilocos Norte on an expansion mission. The police team was tasked to contact their intelligence sources in the suspected villages in the town of Piddig, Vintar, and Sarrat, all of which are in Ilocos Norte. In a short period, it was confirmed that said NPA commander was seen contacting persons in those towns. By the first week of July 1981, the government operatives were ready to simultaneously raid all suspected target areas which included an apartment unit right in the City of Laoag. A thorough surveillance was conducted on all these places by the police. On the 11th of July 1981, the raids were conducted successfully.

#### Encounter at Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur (6)

In the early morning of June 12, 1981, a PC patrol sent to verify the presence of an NPA band in an isolated village of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur was fired upon from different directions. One PC soldier was killed and a few others were wounded. The patrol fired back but the NPA band outnumbered the government force, prompting the PC

officer leading the patrol to request reinforcements from the Provincial Command Headquarters. Reinforcements of PC and INP elements led by the Provincial Commander himself arrived at the scene of the encounter after twelve hours. Heavy fighting continued until the early hours of morning when the bulk of the NPA band escaped under the cover of darkness. Two NPA members were killed and, subsequently, four others were reported to have died from wounds sustained during the encounter. Several high-powered firearms, assorted ammunition, and subversive documents were recovered from the scene of the encounter. Government forces suffered one killed and two wounded.

Government reinforcements came from the INP stations of nearby towns, the PC Company in Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, the Provincial Headquarters, and even from the adjacent La Union PC/INP Command. The arrival of reinforcements and their effective deployment prevented the NPA band from disengaging with the government forces. The Provincial Commander, taking over control of the operation, used the police elements as a blocking force along the likely enemy route of withdrawal. The other INP elements were reserves. The PC elements were the main assaulting force. By the time the assault on the CT positions was executed by early dawn, the remaining NPAs had managed to escape through the same route where the police elements were supposed to be prepositioned.

The Provincial Commander suspected that the INP

blocking force elements must have abandoned their positions because of the heavy rain that fell all night. In fact he observed some INP elements sheltering under nearby houses to avoid getting drenched by the rain earlier in the evening.

Charges of murder and illegal possession of firearms were filed against the CTs who were subsequently identified after a thorough investigation.

#### Encounter at Aguilar, Pangasinan (7)

On July 2, 1981 at around 5:00 AM, the presence of approximately fifteen heavily armed men and women in two houses in Barangay, Tampac, Aguilar, Pangasinan, was reported to the Aguilar INP Station. The Station Commander immediately informed the Provincial Commander of these persons, who were believed to be CTs. A PC team led by the Provincial Operations Officer was dispatched from the Provincial Headquarters as was an augmentation from the two adjacent towns of Bugallon and Mangatarem, both of Pangasinan. This augmentation force of PC and INP elements reached Aguilar Police Station in just 45 minutes, and by 8:00 AM an assault operation was underway.

The available PC and INP elements were organized into four teams with two teams tasked to assault the target houses, while the other two teams were to occupy two prominent hills just 250 meters from the houses which were

the only escape route for the CTs. By 8:30 AM the teams were all in position. The assaulting teams then shouted to the occupants of both houses to come out and surrender. The CTs ran out of the houses one by one and a running gunbattle ensued. Even the teams occupying the hills joined the firefight, which lasted for three hours. The government troops did not suffer a single casualty. On the enemy side, four CTs were killed, three were wounded, and two were captured. Two other CTs were able to escape. The PC and INP elements also recovered assorted high-powered firearms, a hand grenade, assorted ammunition, and voluminous documents.

The Provincial Operations Officer, who directed the operation, commented in his after-operation report that the key to the success of the operation was the surprise achieved by the quick response of all the involved units. Augmentation arrived in only 45 minutes following the report of the Aguilar INP Station Commander to the Provincial Commander. No prior reconnaissance was necessary because of the familiarity of the Aguilar INP Station elements with the area. Troop disposition and final deployment went without a hitch with the terrain put to maximum advantage for the government force encountered was the insufficiency of tactical communication sets which hampered coordination.

### NPA Attack in Sadanga, Mountain Province (8)

In the early morning of December 22, 1981, a group of heavily-armed CTs attacked a PC detachment in Barangay, Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province. The CTs occupied the high ground surrounding the detachment. The PC men immediately called for reinforcements from their mother company. The reinforcing PC teams were, however, ambushed before reaching the detachment. They were pinned down by CT fires until the CTs altogether withdrew towards the forested area. The only reinforcements that arrived at the scene of the encounter were elements from the Sadanga INP Station led by the Station Commander. They immediately counterattacked forcing the CTs to withdraw. Three PC soldiers were killed in this encounter and eight PC and INP men were wounded, including the Station Commander. The enemy suffered three killed and an undetermined number wounded as evidenced by blood stains along the CT route of withdrawal.

The Provincial Commander of Mountain Province described the CT attack as having been carefully planned, considering the timing and enemy disposition in both the attack on the detachment and the ambushade. The CTs occupied excellent ambush positions in anticipation of government reinforcements from the PC company. Only the timely arrival of the police reinforcements from the sadanga INP Station prevented what could have been a

massacre. In fact, the Station Commander, who led the INP reinforcements and who was himself wounded during the encounter, was meritoriously promoted by the Chief of Constabulary upon the recommendation of the Provincial Commander.

#### PC Commanders and Their Police in Combat Operations

A total of nine ranking PC officers were interviewed for this study. Three are presently provincial commanders in Region 1 and four were former PC commanders of the same region. One is presently a ground attache on detail with the foreign ministry and the other was, until January 1984, a commander of a PC battalion which operated in the western Visayas region. These officers were asked to give their personal assessments of the current employment of the police in counterinsurgency operations with respect to command and control, strengths and weaknesses, and the manner of employment in combat and other security operations.

The following were the comments of the PC officers:

1. On command and control:

1. Police integration has placed all the police under the command of the provincial commanders, thereby contributing to the unity of command in the provinces.
2. Police integration has provided the provincial commanders additional forces for employment in counterinsurgency operations.



3. Police integration has placed the police within the disciplinary authority of the provincial commanders.
4. Police integration has provided flexibility in that PC commanders can shift PC/INP elements where they are most needed.
2. On police employment in combat and other security operations:
  1. If PC troops are available in adequate numbers, there is a general preference to utilize purely PC force in combat operations.
  2. When police elements are employed in combat operations, they are used as reserves or as a blocking force.
  3. In operations in distant villages, the police are employed as guides and as liason to coordinate with village officials and judicial authorities.
  4. For raids, searches, and seizures within the town centers, a purely police force may be employed with greater effectiveness.
  5. In all counterinsurgency operations, the police may be assigned to conduct investigations to determine whether or not certain laws have been violated by the involved insurgents.
3. On police strengths (advantages):
  1. Inherent police familiarity with the area and population is highly advantageous to government forces operating in the vicinity.
  2. Presence of the police even in the far-flung insurgent-affected areas is a common occurrence which ordinarily does not disclose impending government operations, thereby avoiding suspicion on the part of the enemy.
  3. Police participation in government operations often results in the greater popular support for the operations.
4. On police weaknesses (drawbacks):
  1. Current police personnel strengths are barely

adequate for normal police missions. Their employment in counterinsurgency operations will greatly jeopardize local police functions.

2. Standard police weapons are of the low-powered types and are not meant for combat operations. Even if police stations are issued high-powered firearms like the M16 rifle, the police would lack the appropriate weapons training.
3. The police are not adequately schooled on insurgency and the conditions in which it thrives. As such, they are normally dependent on the PC units for direction in counterinsurgency operations.
4. The police tend to openly talk of impending operations thereby jeopardizing chances of success.
5. The police lack combat discipline which is vital to operations.

#### Summary

Police integration in the Philippines has brought the local police into the military chain of command. Being an integral part of the Philippine Constabulary, the INP cannot divorce itself from the basic PC missions as a major service of the AFP despite the fact the IN has its own prescribed missions. Since police stations are under the provincial commands, they automatically become one of the resources of PC commanders in the field. So when a provincial command is involved in counterinsurgency operations, the police stations within its jurisdiction often participate in such operations. Their employment in

these operations becomes a prerogative of the commander concerned.

In the several government encounters with the CPP/NPA in Region 1, the police were employed as combatants in the same manner as the PC soldiers were utilized. They were used as blocking force, assault elements, and as reserves. The PC and INP elements were even organized as a composite force as described in the operation in Aguilar, Pangasinan. In most of the operations, the police stations were tapped to reinforce PC elements which were under attack by the CTs. The participation of the police in these encounters with the CTs shows that the INP is another armed and uniformed agency available to the government for use in its stability operations.

An inherent advantage the police have over their military counterparts is their familiarity with the area and their intimacy with the local population. Generally, the police are residents of the towns where they serve. The successful intelligence operations in Ilocos Norte proved this to be true. The presence of the police even in the isolated and inaccessible villages are legitimate covers for government operations where surprise is of vital importance. The current PC/INP program of conducting dialogues among the residents have even increased the visits to, and contacts of the police with, these villages which tend to further government presence in these areas which are usually insurgent-affected. There are, however,

certain drawbacks in the effective use of the police in counterinsurgency operations as experienced by PC provincial commanders who were interviewed. The insufficient number of policemen available in most towns prevents some commanders from utilizing the police for operations against the CTs. Standard police weapons are not ideal for use in combat operations. The police are not properly trained for combat employment and are not knowledgeable on insurgency, its nature, and the conditions in which it thrives. These weaknesses, however, have not prevented the PC commanders from employing their police in combat operations.

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6. Spot Report, Hq. Ilocos Sur PC/INP, June 13, 1981.
7. After Operations Report, Hq. Pangasinan PC/INP, July 5, 1981.
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## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION

#### The Historical Past

The history of the Philippine police system is as old as the country itself. The police have been a part of Philippine way of life, constituting an essential element of local government administration. From the pre-Spanish period through the three hundred years of Spanish colonization until the American period, law enforcement and other related functions were carried out by selected men from within the localities who were clothed with authority to make arrests and maintain law and order. However, it was only since the Spanish era that the police in the towns were formally created. The system of city and municipal police which was established during the American colonial period is considered the forerunner of the present Philippine local police system. Despite the long history of the Philippine police system, its professional development has stagnated mainly because of the bureaucratic practices during both colonial periods. Under the Spaniards, the police, then locally known as cuadrilleros, were volunteers who were rotated

periodically. Worse, the police often did servile jobs for the town and city executives. Under the Americans, the malpractice of utilizing the police for personal purposes by the local administrators was perpetuated. The tenure of the policemen was co-terminus with the municipal presidents, who, under the Municipal Code, appointed members of their respective police forces. Such was the status of the police that the Philippine Commission in its annual report for fiscal year ending June 30, 1909 remarked:

As now organized, the municipal police are but poorly paid, and are appointed by the incoming president of each municipality, holding office under the provisions of the Municipal Code only during his term. The period of service of the police is too short and their tenure too insecure to produce the best results, as they are only too often simply political agents or messengers of the president and can hardly be expected to prove impartial guardians of the peace. (1)

After the granting of Philippine independence in 1946, the police system which existed during the American period prevailed. The municipal and city mayors appointed the members of their respective police forces, these forces being independent of one another. The local executives, like their counterparts during the Spanish and American colonial days, made the police do personal services to the detriment of public service. As politics deteriorated through the years to pure power play in many parts of the country, the state of police affairs changed from bad to worse. The local police, to a large extent, became

involved in partisan politics. Not even the police reforms under the Police Act of 1966 noticeably improved the police service. This sad state of the police service soon became a national concern, prompting police integration.

### Police Integration

Considering the ills of the local police system which developed hand in hand with the existing bureaucratic conditions, integration of the police into a national organization appeared to be the only viable remedy. Police integration paved the way towards better public safety services by removing the obstacles which have prevented professionalism in the police service. It provided for the standardization of police administration, equipment and logistics, and training and operations, which otherwise could not have been economically and technically possible under the old decentralized system. While police integration did not entirely solve the problems of the local police system, it nevertheless made future reform programs easily manageable.

Police integration is not a new concept in the world of police service. Several European countries such as France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and England have highly centralized police systems under national supervision. In Asia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia are known to all have a similar system of centralized



police service. In the Philippines, the INP has been created by merging the local police forces into the existing organization of the PC, thereby placing the local police under national control and direction. (2)

Despite police integration, the PC did not lose its status as a major service of the AFP. This dual character of the PC brought about the existence of a civilian component represented by the local police and a military component represented by the Constabulary, both in the same organization. Such a situation may not be desirable. The mix may only lead to conflicts within the organization especially because the police are generally subordinated to their Constabulary counterparts at practically all levels of command. More so, the dominance of the Constabulary in the general and special staffs precludes impartiality in the general administration of the INP. This very precarious situation in the INP may yet be the calvary for police integration in the Philippines.

Another objection to the police-military mix in the INP is the difference in orientation of the police vis-a-vis that of the military. The police are generally oriented along the lines of crime suppression and prevention, while the Constabulary, being military in orientation, are trained towards the destruction of the enemy. Furthermore, the police are trained to work more as individuals rather than in a team/unit effort as in the case for the military. A policeman will arrest an offender

not because he was directed or ordered by his commander but because the law violated so provides. With the strong influence of the Constabulary over the police, the military orientation may eventually prevail in the INP which may not be very desirable insofar as police or public safety services are concerned.

In the same fashion, the INP falling directly under the control and supervision of the Philippine military hierarchy runs contrary to established practices in countries with national police organizations. Police service is a civilian function and generally has been controlled and supervised by civil governments through civilian ministries or agencies. The Philippine Constabulary itself was originally established by the Philippine Commission as a civilian insular police which was distinct from the US Army and its local counterpart, the Philippine Scouts. Members of the PC were not merely acquired a military character because its initial set of officers came from the US Army and these officers employed military standards of leadership and discipline. To stress the civilian status of the old Constabulary, the Philippine Commission in its report in 1907 observed:

The Constabulary have made an excellent record in suppressing lawlessness and maintaining good order in the provinces due to the good relations with the people and provincial and municipal officials and to the fact that the constabulary force as a body has come to regard itself as a civil and not a military organization. (3)

## The INP and Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations

The Communist insurgency in the Philippines had its roots on the socio-economic-political imbalances prevailing in the country which have been exploited by the local Communist party, the CPP. These imbalances grew out of the influences of the colonial past of the Philippines. Elitism, landlordism, and other influences have resulted not only in a wide gap between the rich and the poor but, to a large extent, in other forms of injustices like the judicial system and economic opportunities being impartial towards the powerful few. The rise in criminality was also a consequence. It is within this context that the role of the police in an insurgent environment is best recognized.

Considering that "peace and order" is a major issue of the insurgent cause, the best contribution the local police can make to the government counterinsurgency effort could be an effective and efficient police service. Effective control of criminality depends greatly on the competence of the local police forces. Moreover, good police service enhances the overall image of the government, in that public safety services are a vital function of government which affect the day to day lives of the population. Such police service would then draw enormous public support for the government in its fight against Communist insurgency. In this regard, police integration and current police reform programs put the

local police in the best position to support government counterinsurgency efforts. Accepted concepts in internal defense and development (IDAD) operations confirm this observation:

In many respects, law enforcement officials are the first line of defense against actions of insurgents and terrorists. The fate of the government and the nation may hang in the balance and the outcome may be determined by the success or failure of early police work. (4)

Police integration has resulted in the active participation of the police in operations normally performed by the Constabulary of the military. Now that the local police are under the administrative and operational control and supervision of PC commanders, employment of the police is no longer confined to traditional police roles. Personnel shortages among the Constabulary field units have necessitated police augmentation for PC units engaged in combat operations. On the other hand, police stations are not in the position to effectively combat terrorism due to variety of reasons, which likewise necessitates PC takeover of such operations. On the part of the police, their participation in combat operations interferes with normal police duties and unnecessarily exposes them to situations which they are not adequately trained to handle.

The current organizational structure of the police stations (See Appendices E & F) does not provide for a special section or division devoted solely to deal with

Communist terrorists. British counterinsurgency operations have always provided for a special branch in the police system which handled both the intelligence and operations aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. Such was the case during the successful operations against Communist insurgency in Malaya, now Malaysia. In fact, the Royal Malaysian Police, which is a national police organization, still maintains the Special Branch as a major component because of the continuing insurgence problem in that country. This is not so with the INP despite the growing problem of Communist insurgency in the Philippines.

In the several accounts of encounters between government forces and the CTs, the police were employed in a variety of ways. In one operation, they were employed as reserves; and in another instance, as a blocking force. It appeared that in combat operations, PC commanders did not distinguish between Constabulary soldiers and policemen. PC and police elements were utilized interchangeably. The police military-type firearm, became a combatant no different from his Constabulary counterpart. While the employment of the police in combat operations was, in most part, out of necessity, these encounters revealed the absence of any doctrine governing proper police employment in combat operations. What appears to be the prevailing rule influencing the PC commanders' concepts in employing the police is their authority over the various police stations within their respective jurisdictions. It was

evident that the PC commanders took advantage of this command relationship to augment PC personnel shortfalls rather than in conformity to doctrine.

There were obvious shortcomings in the employment of police in combat operations. The PC commanders themselves recognized all these. In fact, they have, within their respective competence, initiated limited training programs to equip their police with working knowledge of Communist insurgency, with emphasis on intelligence and combat operations. With determined and dedicated leadership, the PC commanders have judiciously employed the police in operations against the CTs. By doing so, they proved the police has a significant role in Philippine counterinsurgency operations.

#### Findings and Conclusion

August 8, 1975 is a significant date in the history of police service in the Philippines. On this day, the INP was established with the PC as its nucleus. With a single stroke, the old police system of decentralized and independent police forces transitioned into a national police organization which solved many problems that afflicted the police service. With national control and supervision, the INP has become more capable of providing the public safety needs of the country and consequently, has become more responsive to fulfill national security

obligations.

Beyond its having been transformed into a national organization, certain aspects of police integration can not be viewed with favor. The Constabulary-police mix in one big organization will certainly result to disparities which may not contribute to the professional growth of the INP. Further complicating this situation is the present organizational structure of the INP wherein the police are subordinated to their PC counterparts at practically all levels of command. With police service being fundamentally civilian in character, the control and supervision the AFP currently has over the INP may also be inimical ultimately to the future of the latter. As earlier discussed, public interest can be served best if police service were to retain this civilian character. For the INP to sustain its initial success, therefore, Philippine government authorities must focus some attention to the foregoing observations.

Police employment in combat operations is restricted by their lack of training, low-powered weaponry, logistical insufficiencies, and personnel shortages. The absence of doctrine regarding police employment in combat operations has resulted in the indiscriminate use of the police by their Constabulary commanders. Moreover, the existing organizational structures of police stations do not provide for a special branch or a specific section to handle terrorism or counterinsurgency operations. This has

resulted occasionally to undue degradation of normal police activities when these police are involved in security operations.

Nevertheless, recent developments in the Philippine police system have proved the police can play a significant role in the overall government counterinsurgency operations. While the traditional role of providing effective and efficient police service is the INP's main contribution to the effort, the police manpower resources and the inherent popular support they enjoy suggest greater role in counterinsurgency operations. Given the adequate administrative, operational and logistical support, training, and the proper leadership, the local police as a national organization could yet be "the great difference" in the government effort against Communist insurgency in the Philippines.



## END NOTES

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p. 138.
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3. Report of the Philippine Commission-- 1907, 1908,  
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4. Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20, January 1981,  
p. 67.

## APPENDICES

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THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE IN PHILIPPINE  
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. (U) ARMY COMMAND AND  
GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS V R DUQUE

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
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
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

## Appendix A

## Map of the Philippines


## Philippines

0 50 100 150 Miles  
0 50 100 150 Kilometers



## Appendix B


## Command Relationships at National Level



MND- Ministry of National Defense  
NAPOLCOM- National Police Commission  
AFP- Armed Forces of the Philippines  
PAF- Philippine Air Force  
PN- Philippine Navy  
PA- Philippine Army  
PC- Philippine Constabulary  
INP- Integrated National Police

## Appendix C


## INP Organization at National Level



PCM- PC Metropolitan Command  
MPF- Metropolitan Police Force  
GMA- Greater Manila Area  
METRODISCOM- Metropolitan District Command

## Appendix D

## INP Organization at Regional Level




ADMIN- Administration  
OPNS- Operations  
R1- Personnel  
R2- Intelligence  
R3- Operations  
R4- Logistics  
R5- Civil Relations/Home Defense  
R6- Comptrollership




## Appendix E

## INP Organization at Provincial Level



## Appendix F

## INP Organization at Police Station Level



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